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FERC V. EPSA AND THE PATH TO  
A CLEANER ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Joel B. Eisen * 
 
t is no stretch to call Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric 
Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”) 1  the most significant Supreme Court 
decision involving the modern electric grid since the 2002 decision in 
New York v. FERC validated the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) rule that undergirds modern wholesale electricity markets.2 This 
January, in a 6–2 decision authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that 
FERC has authority over “demand response” (“DR”)—bids of reductions in 
electricity consumption into wholesale markets3—under the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”).4 The Court also held that FERC’s formula for compensating DR at 
the same wholesale market price paid to generators in the energy markets 
administered by regional grid operators known as independent system operators 
(“ISOs”) and regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”)5 was not arbitrary 																																																								
* Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow, University of Richmond School of Law. 
The author thanks Emily Hammond for her insights and the Harvard Environmental Law Review 
for the kind invitation to participate in this special issue. 
1 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
2 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 1019–20, 1028 (2002). The New York decision upheld core 
provisions of FERC’s Order No. 888. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. § 35,385). 
3 FERC defines “demand response” as “a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by 
customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy 
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy.” 18 C.F.R. § 
35.28(b)(4) (2015); Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority over 
Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY L. 69, 70 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?] (describing the 
various forms of DR). 
4 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 765, 784. Five Justices joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, with Justices 
Scalia and Thomas dissenting. (Justice Alito recused himself from the case.) 
5  Today, seven regional grid operators—ISOs and RTOs—manage transmission and oversee 
wholesale power markets. See FERC, ELECTRIC MARKET OVERVIEW (2012), 
https://perma.cc/729F-G46R; The Role of ISOs and RTOs, ISO/RTO COUNCIL, 
https://perma.cc/6RXA-F7VZ; Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 12,088 (Jan. 6, 2000) (encouraging RTOs’ formation and set forth requirements for qualifying 
to be an RTO); Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,595–96 (establishing requirements for ISOs); 
Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in 
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and capricious. In reaching these conclusions, the Court reversed a decision of 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that had invalidated FERC’s second major 
DR rule,6 Order 745.7 
EPSA capped more than a decade of activity aimed at promoting DR in 
wholesale electricity markets.8 Today, these markets provide power that serves 
two-thirds of the nation’s electricity load.9 FERC sees enormous potential for 
DR in these markets as a tool for reducing electricity consumption and thereby 
balancing supply and demand and reducing costs to consumers,10 improving 
reliability,11 and achieving environmental benefits.12 Because there had been 																																																																																																																										
Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2005) (describing require-
ments for ISOs and RTOs); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in 
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 149–57 (2016) (describing the evolution of modern 
wholesale power markets and their operation). The difference between “ISO” and “RTO” is 
unimportant to the analysis in this Introduction. Cf. Hammond and Spence, supra, at 153 n.56 
(reaching the same conclusion for a discussion of grid reliability). 
ISOs and RTOs manage energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets, with the first of the-
se at issue in EPSA. Energy markets trade power through bids that establish market clearing prices. 
Id. at 154. Ancillary services markets trade reserves (generation not currently used but available to 
serve load) and other services such as “regulation” (services necessary to keep grid frequency in 
balance). Id. at 153. Forward capacity markets, at issue in the Supreme Court this spring in Hughes 
v. Talen Energy Marketing, PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. 
granted sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-614), 
aim for resource adequacy by providing incentives to ensure sufficient generating capacity in the 
region to meet projected future demand. See infra notes 63–66. 
6 EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773. 
7 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 
FERC ¶ 61,187 (2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35).   
8 The Court described the introduction of DR into wholesale markets in the early 2000s. EPSA, 
136 S. Ct. at 770. DR itself is nothing new, as it dates to “curtailment” and “peak shaving” 
programs of the 1980s and 1990s. Jon Wellinghoff & David E. Morenoff, Recognizing the 
Importance of Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 
28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 394 (2007). 
9  FERC, Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC (2016), https://perma.cc/ 
3GNA-JPJ9.  
10 Owen Comstock, Demand Response Saves Electricity During Times of High Demand, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/BMP8-6CDA (discussing DR’s role 
during times of peak demand to reduce stress on the electric grid, and showing peak demand 
savings of 12,700 MW in 2014); FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770 (citing a 2007 study showing 
that “a demand response program reducing electricity usage by 3% in peak hours would lead to 
price declines of 6% to 12%”).  
For one particularly significant example of DR’s role in to reducing grid stress, see FERC, 
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING 11–13 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/F6MH-D2PE, which discussed DR’s important role in meeting the “numerous 
challenges for electricity system operators” during the extremely cold winter of 2013–2014. 
11 Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and the Smart Grid, 7 
HOUSTON ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 203 (2012) (discussing DR’s role in providing 
regulation in ancillary services markets and thereby improving reliability by balancing intermittent 
resources such as solar and wind). 
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little DR participation, however, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 stated Con-
gress’ policy that “unnecessary barriers to demand response participation in 
energy, capacity and ancillary service markets shall be eliminated.”13 Three years 
later, FERC issued Order 719.14 That rule required ISOs and RTOs to revise 
their tariffs and allow DR aggregators (firms that bundle demand reductions 
and bid them into wholesale energy markets)15 to participate in wholesale 
markets.16 Order 719 required ISOs and RTOs to permit aggregators to bid 
DR on behalf of retail customers directly into the wholesale markets, except 
where a state’s laws prevented it.17 Yet barriers to entry continued to hamper 
DR’s growth.18  
To address this situation, FERC issued Order 745 in 2011.19 It aimed to 
address “concerns that current compensation levels inhibited meaningful 
demand-side participation” in wholesale markets.20 It required ISOs and RTOs 																																																																																																																										
12 By reducing peak demand, DR may reduce emissions from existing power plants and help avoid 
“unnecessary expenses of building new generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure” 
and the pollution associated with it. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart 
Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federal-
ism for the Smart Grid].  
The extent to which DR leads to emissions reductions has been debated. If customers reduce 
purchases from wholesale markets, but substitute polluting sources “behind the meter” such as 
diesel back-up generators, the emissions reductions would be less substantial. See Del. Dep’t of Nat. 
Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting EPA’s “Reciprocating 
Internal Combustion Engines” emissions standards that allowed back-up diesel generators to 
operate more often to promote DR); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND 
RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM 29 
(2006), https://perma.cc/ZC9M-8J8X (noting emissions reductions as a potential benefit but 
cautioning that emissions reductions are “dependent on the emissions profiles and marginal 
operating costs of the generation plants in specific regions”). 
13 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 1252(f), 119 Stat. 966 (2005). 
14 Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 64,100–01 (Oct. 28, 2008). 
15 Aggregators, or “curtailment service providers,” bundle demand reductions and bid them into 
wholesale markets. Order 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 para. 19; 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(iii) (2015) 
(requiring ISOs and RTOs to receive bids from aggregators). This facilitates market entry by those 
customers precluded from trading on wholesale markets under RTOs’ market rules that require 
bidders to offer a minimum amount of energy. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 
3, at 81. 
16 Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,101. 
17 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(i).   
18  PETER CAPPERS, JASON MACDONALD & CHARLES GOLDMAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
NAT’L LAB., MARKET AND POLICY BARRIERS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE PROVIDING 
ANCILLARY SERVICES IN U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 3 (2013) (discussing barriers to aggrega-
tor participation in ancillary services markets and citing studies by FERC and others about barriers 
to DR aggregator participation in wholesale markets). 
19 Order 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187. 
20 Id. para. 1. 
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to compensate DR bid by aggregators in wholesale energy markets at the 
prevailing market price received by generators, assuming DR resources “have 
the capability to balance supply and demand and when payment of the market 
price for energy to these resources is cost-effective as determined by a net 
benefits test.”21 FERC justified Order 745 under two FPA provisions: Section 
205,22 giving it authority to decide just and reasonable rates, and Section 206,23 
giving it the power to remedy discriminatory practices affecting wholesale rates.  
The Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”, the trade association for 
generators in competitive markets) and other challengers opposed Order 745. 
They succeeded in the D.C. Circuit, where a divided three-judge panel held 
that Order 745 was “ultra vires agency action.”24 In the court’s view, DR was 
solely a retail-level activity and therefore the exclusive province of the states, 
FERC had no authority over it, and, moreover, giving FERC jurisdiction over 
DR would have no boundaries.25 Summoning a parade of horribles, the court 
believed that if Order 745 stood, FERC could extend its regulatory reach deep 
into the economy, even regulating the steel and labor markets if it so chose.26 
The decision threw DR’s future into chaos.27  																																																								
21 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v). 
22 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012).   
23 Section 206 empowers FERC to remedy a practice it finds “unjust” or “unreasonable”: if “any rule, 
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, 
unduly discriminatory or preferential,” FERC must “determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, 
classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall 
fix the same by order.” 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). The discrimination, in the case of DR, was the 
compensation scheme that precluded it from taking part meaningfully in the markets. 
24 EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
25 Id. at 221–22. The D.C. Circuit also rejected the pricing formula itself as arbitrary and capricious. 
Id. at 225. 
26 Id. at 221. 
27 The D.C. Circuit’s decision only invalidated DR bids into energy markets. Yet because it held 
that FERC lacked authority over DR, it jeopardized DR’s status in all wholesale markets. On the 
same day as the decision was issued, FirstEnergy Corp. filed a complaint asking FERC to extend 
its reach, bar DR bids into the PJM RTO’s capacity market, and order PJM to recalculate the 
results (without DR) of its most recent capacity auction. Complaint of FirstEnergy Service Co. at 
1–2, FirstEnergy Serv. Co. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC (FERC 2014) (No. EL14-55-000). 
Over the next eighteen months, the result was a series of stopgap and transitional proposals 
designed to adapt to the decision, leaving the ultimate fate of DR in markets up in the air. Robert 
Walton, Uncertainty Is the New Constant for Demand Response Markets, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 8, 
2015), https://perma.cc/M3ND-SWY3. 
Uncertainty extended to how DR might be conducted as an exclusively state-level matter. 
PETER CAPPERS & ANDY SATCHWELL, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE REGULATORS AND POLICYMAKERS IN A POST-FERC ORDER 
745 WORLD (2015), https://perma.cc/TZ5R-UUSN (pre-EPSA analysis explaining in detail, with 
references to individual states’ situations, how DR programs might be administered in the absence 
of FERC authority over them).  
2016] EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector: Introduction 
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Reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the FPA’s “plain 
terms” gave FERC authority to regulate DR in wholesale markets.28 Under the 
FPA, FERC’s authority extends to “the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.”29 This gives it authority, the Court stated, to regulate “both whole-
sale rates and the panoply of rules and practices affecting them.”30 Construing 
FPA Section 206, the Court stated that FERC has authority over discrimina-
tory “practices” that “directly affect” wholesale rates.31 Interpreting the term 
“practices,” the Court stated, “As we have explained in addressing similar terms 
like ‘relating to’ or ‘in connection with,’ a non-hyperliteral reading is needed to 
prevent the statute from assuming near-infinite breadth.”32 The Court relied on 
case precedent limiting FERC’s broad authority. Citing a D.C. Circuit case 
involving California’s grid operator,33 the Court found that, “under a common-
sense construction of the FPA’s language,” FERC’s jurisdiction is limited “to 
rules or practices that ‘directly affect the [wholesale] rate.’”34 The Court rejected 
claims by Order 745’s opponents that this construction expanded FERC’s 
jurisdiction too broadly.35 
Justice Kagan stated that Order 745 satisfied the “directly affecting” stand-
ard “with room to spare,”36 observing that “market operators’ payments for 
demand response commitments” are practices that “directly affect wholesale 
rates.”37 The Court’s explanation was straightforward and compelling: “Whole-
sale demand response, in short, is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too, 
then, the rules and practices that determine how those programs operate.”38 
Moreover, the Court found that to hold otherwise would “conflict with the 																																																								
28 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 773 (2016). 
29 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). As EPSA acknowledged, the FPA closed the “Attleboro gap” and 
created a clear split between state and federal authority. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (citing Pub. Util. 
Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927)).   
30 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773. 
31 Id. at 773–74. 
32 Id. at 774. 
33 Cal. Indep. Sys. Op. Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s 
Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
[hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid] (discussing 
CAISO’s application to limiting a “directly affecting” standard); Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart 
Grid?, supra note 3, at 91–92 (discussing CAISO’s importance in empowering FERC to regulate 
practices affecting wholesale rates).   
34 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774 (citing Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403). 
35 Id. at 774. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
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Act’s core purposes by preventing all use of a tool that no one (not even EPSA) 
disputes will curb prices and enhance reliability in the wholesale electricity 
market.”39 
The “directly affecting” standard, and the Court’s application of it to DR, 
rest on a cogently articulated interpretation of the FPA.40 It is consistent with 
the analysis in the amicus brief that the author and three co-authors filed with 
the Court on behalf of twenty-five energy law scholars.41 And, a historical 
analysis of the “practices affecting rates” language demonstrates that it has been 
interpreted broadly and flexibly in the context of the FPA and other regulatory 
statutes since the early 1900s, and that in the specific setting of the electric grid, 
the “directly affecting” test is the logical culmination of developments that have 
been decades in the making.42  
In granting FERC this broad authority, the Court rejected an argument 
that had swayed the D.C. Circuit: that FERC was impermissibly regulating 
retail sales, authority over which is allocated to the states under the FPA.43 As 
the Court noted, “a FERC regulation does not run afoul of [the FPA’s] pro-
scription just because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of 
retail sales. . . . To the contrary, transactions that occur on the wholesale 
market have natural consequences at the retail level. And so too, of necessity, 
will FERC’s regulation of those wholesale matters.”44 When FERC regulates 
the wholesale markets, the Court concluded, “then no matter the effect on 
retail rates,”45 the FPA does not preclude FERC from regulating. And, the 
Court stated, “in setting rules for demand response, that is all FERC has 																																																								
39Id. at 773.  
40 The Court’s confirmation of FERC’s authority over DR is supported by literature on Order 745 
that demonstrate that the Commission had this authority, notwithstanding its opponents’ claims. 
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33; Eisen, Who 
Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 90–92; cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on Demand 
Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745, GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102, 108 
(2012) (expressing concerns about Order 745 but nonetheless suggesting that it should survive 
judicial review).  
41Amicus Curiae Brief of Energy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. 
Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840) (urging the Court to find that FERC had jurisdiction over DR bid 
into the organized wholesale markets under the FPA’s “practices affecting rates” provision, and 
suggesting that it adopt the “directly affecting” limitation expressed in CAISO).   
42 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33 (discussing 
the history of the “practices affecting rates” provision, concluding that the Court properly found 
that it conferred on FERC authority over DR, and outlining four guidelines for courts and FERC 
for deciding which matters FERC properly regulates and which are left to the states). 
43 EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
44 See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776. 
45 Id. 
2016] EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector: Introduction 
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done.”46 Citing ONEOK v. Learjet,47 its most recent decision on FERC’s 
authority, Justice Kagan observed that, “the Commission’s justifications for 
regulating demand response are all about, and only about, improving the 
wholesale market.”48  
Finally, the Court rejected an argument that paying DR providers market 
prices gives them a “windfall—a kind of ‘double-payment’—unless market 
operators subtract the savings associated with conserving electricity from the 
ordinary compensation level.”49 The Court found that in setting this compensa-
tion formula, the “Commission engaged in reasoned decisionmaking—that it 
weighed competing views, selected a compensation formula with adequate 
support in the record, and intelligibly explained the reasons for making that 
choice.”50   
 
FERC V. EPSA IS A LANDMARK DECISION, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
CANNOT BE UNDERSTATED 
 
First, the Court made a definitive pronouncement on FERC’s authority 
over end users of electricity who also provide resources back to the electric 
grid.51 The “directly affecting” standard now governs how these customers 
participate in the wholesale markets. That will have immediate implications for 
DR’s future in the markets, with specific short-term impacts on DR programs 
that ISOs and RTOs have either underway or on the drawing board.52 In the 
long run, this concise, broad jurisdictional standard gives FERC considerable 																																																								
46 Id. 
47 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015); see also Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s 
Jurisdictional Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (April 28, 
2014), https://perma.cc/46AC-XXBP [hereinafter Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional 
Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction] (discussing the ONEOK decision). 
48 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776–77 (citing ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1599). 
49 Id. at 782; cf. Pierce, supra note 40, at 108 (opposing the pricing scheme but concluding that the 
net benefits test alleviated his concerns by limiting the likely amount of overcompensation). 
50 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782; Emily Hammond, Deference for Interesting Times, 28 GEO. ENVTL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript on file with author) (stating that EPSA’s analysis of the 
pricing issue “illustrates the best of [State Farm] hard-look review for its detailed explanation and 
careful look at the agency’s reasoning”).  
51 See generally Sharon Jacobs, Consumer Generation, ECOL. L.Q. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing 
challenges to managing “prosumers” on the electric grid). 
52 David T. Doot et al., What’s Next for Wholesale Electricity Market Operators, LAW360 (Feb. 
11, 2016), https://perma.cc/E2WS-MQVJ (discussing the impacts of EPSA on current DR docket 
proceedings in the PJM Interconnection LLC, ISO-New England, Midcontinent ISO, New York 
ISO, and California ISO). The first two of these RTOs will see considerable change, because their 
DR programs were thrown into uncertainty after the D.C. Circuit’s decision. See id. 
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flexibility to promote a cleaner, more efficient Smart Grid.53 FERC has ample 
authority over the electric grid, so long as its initiatives may be construed as 
“practices” that “directly affect” wholesale electricity rates. This opens up a vast 
new frontier for FERC to innovate and pursue broad policy goals—such as 
promoting clean and renewable energy—in the wholesale markets, as long as 
the core “directly affecting” standard is met. As one analysis has demonstrated, 
FERC could justify a (hypothetical) carbon price in the wholesale markets 
under this standard.54  
EPSA’s treatment of the split between federal and state jurisdiction over 
the electric grid is also noteworthy. The Court concluded that FERC’s authori-
ty in the wholesale markets over DR is not exclusive and must coexist with 
state jurisdiction. Indeed, EPSA features “notable solicitude” for the states’ 
historical role in electricity regulation.55 Under Orders 719 and 745, states can 
also exercise control over DR aggregators. They can prohibit consumers from 
bidding DR into wholesale markets, license aggregators and conduct any DR 
programs that do not involve bidding into the wholesale markets. Finally, 
because states set retail rates, they can “insulate them from price fluctuations in 
the wholesale market.”56 
This analysis heralds a new era of allocating jurisdictional responsibility 
over the electric grid. It recognizes that both FERC and the states can simulta-
neously take actions impacting the wholesale markets, and therefore 
contemplates concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.57 This might appear to be a 
break from the jurisdictional dividing line that has characterized electricity 
regulation since the FPA’s enactment in 1935. Under that well-known stand-
ard, as noted above, federal jurisdiction extends to wholesale transactions and 
the states retain jurisdiction over retail sales.58 However, as the Court has now 
noted,59 reflecting the views of many other observers,60 this bright line jurisdic-
tional split is unworkable in the modern, interconnected electric grid.  																																																								
53 For a discussion of the Smart Grid’s opportunities and challenges, see Eisen, Smart Regulation 
and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 12. 
54 Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33, at 38–45. 
55 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779. 
56 Id. at 777. 
57 See generally Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2016). 
58 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 768. 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33, at 
6–7; Rossi, supra note 57; Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and 
State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203 (2015); Sharon Jacobs, Bypassing 
Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 941 (2015) (“[T]he 
2016] EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector: Introduction 
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EPSA eschews this last remnant of the bygone era of “dual federalism”61 
that treated federal and state jurisdiction formalistically as separate and distinct 
spheres of authority. Instead, it recognizes that state and federal authority over 
the electric grid must be construed as overlapping. This has enormous implica-
tions going forward. Working with the “directly affecting” test may yield a 
clearer picture of state and federal concurrent jurisdiction, preserving room for 
each level of government to craft policies for integrating clean and renewable 
energy into the electric grid, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving 
other goals.62   
However, this new approach leaves many questions unanswered. One issue 
not addressed in EPSA is how far states can go in electricity regulation if their 
laws impact wholesale markets. This spring, the Court will test this proposi-
tion—and therefore, the “directly affecting” test’s contours—in Hughes v. 
Talen Energy Marketing. 63  Hughes involves Maryland’s law that provided 
incentives for a new power plant to locate in the state. Maryland state officials 
believed the price signals produced by the PJM capacity market were not 
leading to construction of enough new power plants in the state. To prompt 
building of a new plant, the law offered a subsidy above the market clearing 
price. FERC claimed this interfered with pricing in the wholesale markets, and 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.64 It found that field preemption 
applied, concluding the scheme of federal regulation of wholesale markets is so 
all-encompassing that it leaves no room for the state law.65  
EPSA upheld FERC’s authority generally over DR, and because it did not 
evaluate a specific state law’s impacts on wholesale markets, the preemption 																																																																																																																										
federalism boundaries drawn in 1935 in the Federal Power Act may no longer be appropriate in 
today’s world.”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid 
Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 99 (2015).  
61  Wiseman, supra note 60, at 97; see also Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exemption, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 139 (2001) 
(describing the “death” of dual federalism generally). 
62 See generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33, 
and accompanying text (discussing a hypothetical carbon adder in the wholesale markets). 
63 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-614). The speed with 
which the Court is acting to clarify jurisdictional issues left open after EPSA is itself unusual. Ari 
Peskoe, Electricity Regulation Is Back at the Supreme Court, Again, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE 
(Feb. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/M4NZ-JZ93 (“It is highly unusual for the Supreme Court to 
decide two cases about electricity regulation in a single term.”). 
64 See generally Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 467. The Third Circuit struck down a similar New Jersey 
law, and while the Court did not accept that case for review, the decision in Hughes is widely 
expected to impact the New Jersey law, due to the similarity between the two states’ laws. PPL 
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). 
65 Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 476. 
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issue did not arise. At oral argument in Hughes, the Justices appeared ready to 
uphold the Fourth Circuit.66 The Court can be expected to reiterate FERC’s 
sole authority over wholesale rates, and may use principles of conflict preemp-
tion (instead of field preemption) to decide that Maryland’s law conflicts with 
the FPA and cannot stand because it directly changes the amount a power 
plant owner receives from the wholesale markets. This would also be warranted 
under EPSA. Setting rules for capacity market auctions is an obvious example 
of a “practice” that “directly affects” wholesale rates.  
Yet the states’ authority over power plants is also unquestioned. States may 
select the types, sizes, and sites of power plants to be built in the state. Using 
conflict preemption principles might leave room for other state incentives to 
promote power plant development, as long as the state does not interfere 
directly with wholesale rates.67 A clue to how the Court may set the boundaries 
between federal and state jurisdiction comes from the test it enunciated in 
ONEOK, under which a state law is preempted if it is “aimed directly at 
interstate purchasers and wholesales for resale.”68 But the challenge of striking 
the jurisdictional balance accurately in Hughes shows the work begun in EPSA 
is hardly complete.  
Finally, EPSA is significant as a signal of the Court’s approach to statutory 
interpretation. On the issue of FERC’s authority over DR, one might have 
expected the Court to conduct a Chevron 69  analysis. Recently, the Court 
concluded that agencies are accorded Chevron deference when they are deline-
ating the extent of their jurisdiction. 70  The Court could have found the 
statutory term “practices” or “affect” to be ambiguous, and then deferred to 
FERC’s permissible construction in Order 745. Because the Court found that 																																																								
66 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 
19, 2015) (No. 14-614). 
67  As the Solicitor General mentioned in an amicus brief in Hughes, one example would be 
favorable tax policies for power plant development. Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
19, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-614). The Court 
would be more likely to view this as comparable to state antitrust law (at issue in ONEOK) that 
applies broadly to a number of industries, and less likely to invalidate it as taking “direct aim” at the 
wholesale markets. Id. at 22. 
68 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599–1600 (2015); see also Hammond, Energy 
Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction, supra note 47 (discussing potential 
applications of this test). 
69 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also 
Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 74 (arguing that Order 745 was supporta-
ble under Chevron). 
70 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Hammond, Deference for Interesting Times, 
supra note 50, at 4 (noting that “agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations are also awarded Chevron 
deference”).   
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Order 745 “complies with the FPA’s plain terms,”71 however, it grounded its 
holding in the statutory text and explicitly stated that it was not addressing 
FERC’s claim that it was entitled to Chevron deference.72 This makes EPSA 
all the more important because the Court’s construction of the FPA makes it 
difficult for future Commissions to alter or reverse this finding.73     
Putting this all together, EPSA’s importance is evident. It highlights how 
an eighty-year-old statute can be retooled for the modern era74 and yet retain 
consistency with a body of law spanning over more than 100 years.75 FERC’s 
ability to control “practices” on an industry-wide basis, with appropriate limits 
set by the Court, may have far-reaching consequences almost unimaginable 
today. Consider the analogy of the modern telecommunications industry.76 A 
1956 decision—Hush-A-Phone77—allowed phone customers to attach a plastic 
device to a phone to reduce the risk of overhearing a phone call,78 and the 1968 
FCC Carterfone 79  ruling invalidated AT&T’s prohibition of a device that 
manually connected private two-way radio systems to the telephone network.80 																																																								
71 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760,773 (2016). 
72 Id. at 773 n.5 (“Because we think FERC’s authority clear, we need not address the Government’s 
alternative contention that FERC’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference under 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).”); see also 
Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries: Staying the Course, GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. DOCKET (Jan. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/MR4G-UZCN (discussing EPSA as part of a 
“trend toward more traditional, pre-Chevron approaches to interpreting regulatory statutes”). 
73 Hammond, Deference for Interesting Times, supra note 50, at 4 (noting that under Brand X, if 
an agency’s construction of its own jurisdiction was accorded Chevron deference, “this means that 
an agency could also change its view of its jurisdictional authority provided the statute is ambigu-
ous”).  
74 For a general discussion of this challenge, see Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, 
New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
75 See generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33. 
76 This analogy is explored in Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing 
Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1712 (2014) [hereinafter Eisen, An 
Open Access Distribution Tariff]. 
77 Id. at 1743 n.161 (citing Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). 
78 Hush-A-Phone involved the “practices affecting rates” provision of the Communications Act of 
1934, worded similarly to the FPA’s provision. In that case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument 
by the monopoly company—AT&T—that claimed the statutory provision gave it the right to 
“forbid attachment to the telephone of any device ‘not furnished by the telephone company.’” 
Hush-A-Phone Corp., 238 F.2d at 267, 269. The D.C. Circuit established a principle that 
prohibiting a customer’s “foreign attachment” (the Hush-A-Phone was a plastic device designed to 
fit over the ear and reduce background interference with phone calls) was “in unwarranted interfer-
ence with the telephone subscriber’s right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are 
privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.” Id. at 269; see also Eisen, An Open Access 
Distribution Tariff, supra note 76, at 1744 n.162.  
79 In re Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
80 Id.; see also Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 76, at 1744 n.163.  
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These decisions established fundamental principles that enabled the connection 
of much more sophisticated equipment to communications networks. Without 
Hush-A-Phone and Carterfone there would have been no answering machines, 
fax machines, and no modems connected without telephone company interfer-
ence. So, without these decisions—both of which attracted little public 
recognition at the time—there would be no consumer use of the Internet.81 
Is EPSA the electric grid’s Hush-A-Phone or Carterfone? Time will tell. 
For now, FERC has authority over practices “directly affecting” wholesale rates, 
and Order 745’s core requirement has been upheld: when DR is bid into the 
wholesale markets, it must be compensated at the same level that generators 
receive.82  Still, as noted above, there are significant issues remaining with 
respect to EPSA’s scope.  
The Symposium begins with two Essays that focus on EPSA’s implica-
tions for states and their clean energy policy goals. In The Essential Role of 
State Engagement in Demand Response, Maryland Public Service Commis-
sioner Anne Hoskins and Rhode Island Public Utilities Commissioner Paul 
Roberti discuss EPSA’s potential impacts on their respective states (and others), 
including the interplay with each state’s respective RTO, and discuss the extent 
to which the decision improves the potential for cooperative electricity federal-
ism.83 In FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy 
Resources, Professor Jim Rossi and former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff 
explore the decision’s impact on states’ clean energy initiatives and posit that 
the decision gives states flexibility while ensuring that their policies comple-
ment federal programs.84 
The next two essays advance approaches for fostering grid-edge innovation 
in the aftermath of EPSA. In Balancing on the Grid Edge: Regulating for 
Economic Efficiency in the Wake of FERC v. EPSA, Denise A. Grab explains 
why it is optimal to allow all regulators who are making policy decisions involv-
ing technologies at the grid edge to consider both the demand- and supply-side 
effects of their decisions, ideally through a comprehensive benefit-cost analy-
																																																								
81 See Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 76, at 1744 n.167 (quoting Jason 
Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 15 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, 
Working Paper No. 31, 1999), https://perma.cc/K75D-ZJWC. 
82 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016). 
83 Anne Hoskins & Paul Roberti, The Essential Role of State Engagement in Demand Response, 
40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 14 (2016). 
84 Jim Rossi & Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer 
Energy Resources, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 23 (2016). 
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sis. 85  She draws upon examples from New York’s ongoing Reforming the 
Energy Vision proceeding.86 Professor Michael Wara’s Fostering Competition 
in the 21st Century Electricity Industry considers the potential of the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines in facilitating energy 
innovation and the development of robust and fair markets for energy ser-
vices.87 
Finally, Professor Sharon B. Jacobs’s Energy Deference analyzes EPSA’s 
second question presented: whether the price FERC set for demand response 
in wholesale markets was arbitrary and capricious.88 Jacobs frames the Court’s 
analysis within the burgeoning administrative law literature on deference to 
agency actions. She argues that EPSA is faithful to an approach of “super 
deference” because it relies on “deference proxies”: the procedural safeguards 
employed by the agency, the presence or absence of expert opinions sanctioning 
the agency’s choice, or even the presence or absence of a dissenting agency 
decisionmaker.89  
																																																								
85 Denise A. Grab, Balancing on the Grid Edge: Regulating for Economic Efficiency in the Wake 
of FERC v. EPSA, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 32 (2016). 
86 Id. at 38. 
87  Michael Wara, Fostering Competition in the 21st Century Electricity Industry, 40 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. F. 41 (2016). 
88 Sharon B. Jacobs, Energy Deference, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 49 (2016). 
89 Id. at 55–56. 
